THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE: GENERAL WARRANTS OF THE DIGITAL AGE by Aqrabawi, Ramsey



















SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
 
















RAMSEY TALAL AQRABAWI 













A THESIS APPROVED FOR THE 






































































© Copyright by RAMSEY TALAL AQRABAWI 2016 
All Rights Reserved. 
I would like to dedicate this work to my family for always keeping me on 
track, encouraging me and supporting me throughout this entire thesis 
process, my collegiate academic career, and my life in general.   
iv 
Acknowledgements 
Firstly, I want to express my sincere appreciation to the chair of my committee and 
graduate advisor Dr. Justin Wert for his support, guidance, motivation, and knowledge 
during my thesis research and entire collegiate academic career.  I could not have asked 
for a better advisor and mentor during my time at the University of Oklahoma.   
 
Secondly, I would also like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Dr. Ann-Marie 
Szymanski and Dr. Ronald Peters Jr., for their encouragement and unique perspective in 
helping shape my thesis research. Their tough questions helped me to broaden my 
research from other perspectives. 
   
Last but not least, I would like to thank the entire staff in the Political Science 
Department, and more specifically Jeff Alexander, for helping to keep me on track and 
making sure I always had my paperwork and semester in order. 
v 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... iv 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................. vii 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... viii 
Chapter 1: Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2: Origin and Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment ............................... 4 
The Controversy over Writs of Assistance and General Warrants ............................. 5 
State Constitutions and Search and Seizure Policy .................................................... 9 
The Fourth Amendment Signals a Lasting Change .................................................. 13 
Chapter 3: Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence ................................................................ 17 
The Assumption of Risk Theory .............................................................................. 18 
Early Conceptions of a “Search” under the Fourth Amendment ............................. 20 
Chapter 4: The Supreme Court ....................................................................................... 25 
The Supreme Court as a Policy Maker ..................................................................... 25 
Is Dahl’s ruling regime still relevant? ...................................................................... 27 
Models of Judicial Decision Making ........................................................................ 29 
Chapter 5: Conservative Backlash Sets up the Third-Party Doctrine ............................ 32 
Nixon and the Supreme Court .................................................................................. 33 
The Third-Party Doctrine in Academia .................................................................... 36 
Visual Representations of Supreme Court Shifts ..................................................... 37 
Chapter 7: The Third-Party Doctrine is Born ................................................................. 42 
Miller v. United States .............................................................................................. 42 
Smith v. Maryland .................................................................................................... 46 
vi 
Chapter 8: Application of the Third-Party Doctrine ....................................................... 49 
Chapter 9: Cases that possibly support the Third-Party Doctrine .................................. 54 
Balancing Technology and the Fourth Amendment ................................................. 56 
Chapter 10: Critiquing the Third-Party Doctrine ........................................................... 57 
Is Privacy an All-or-Nothing Conception? ............................................................... 58 
How voluntary is the Use of Third-Parties? ............................................................. 60 
Assuming the Risk .................................................................................................... 62 
The Chilling Effect ................................................................................................... 63 
Chapter 11: Recent Developments ................................................................................. 65 
United States v. Jones ............................................................................................... 65 
DOJ Rule 41 Proposed Change ................................................................................ 67 
Riley v. California .................................................................................................... 69 
State v. Andrews ....................................................................................................... 73 
Chapter 12: Conclusion .................................................................................................. 76 
References ...................................................................................................................... 80 
   
vii 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 ........................................................................................................................... 39 
Figure 2 ........................................................................................................................... 40 
viii 
Abstract 
 The Third-Party Doctrine came about in the late 1970’s in two Supreme Court 
rulings in United States v. Miller, and Smith v. Maryland.  The doctrine states that if an 
individual voluntarily provides information to a third party, the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit the government from accessing that information without a warrant 
from the third party.  However, scholars studying the Third Party Doctrine have paid 
less attention to how the doctrine came into being, instead concentrating on the 
implications for jurisprudence.  From a political science perspective, determining what 
allowed the Third-Party Doctrine to come into being is a vital question.  In the past the 
Third-Party Doctrine might have been good law, but that time has since come to pass.  
It is time for Fourth Amendment law to join the 21st Century. 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
When the Founding Fathers met in Philadelphia at Independence Hall and 
created The Constitution of the United States in the summer of 1787, it was a profound 
moment for democracy.  A moment only, perhaps, surpassed by the meeting of the First 
Congress of the United States on September 25, 1789, where twelve amendments to the 
Constitution were proposed to the state legislatures.   
Of the twelve, ten were ratified by the necessary majority of three-fourths of 
state legislatures and these first ten amendments became known as the Bill of Rights on 
December 15, 1791.  Many of the immunities granted to citizens in these first ten 
amendments were the first of their kind to be codified and enumerated by a government 
in the protection of its citizenry.  One amendment in particular, the Fourth Amendment, 
brought into being ideas that had been developing for centuries. 
Among complex clauses and various key terms of the Fourth Amendment comes 
the idea that general warrants are unreasonable and, therefore, unlawful.  This idea that 
some searches and seizures are reasonable and unreasonable had been in development 
across England and then later in the Colonies for years before the creation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  To describe accurately the origin and original meaning of the amendment 
and to provide insight into the framers and public’s thinking the history of the 
amendment will be outlined.  Unfortunately, after over 220 years the very rights, the 
amendment originally sought to protect are at risk from a now arcane doctrine created in 
the 1970’s.  
2 
The Third-Party Doctrine came about in the late 1970’s emanating from two 
Supreme Court rulings in United States v. Miller1 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland2 
(1979).  This doctrine states that if an individual voluntarily provides information to a 
third party, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from accessing 
that information without a warrant from the third party.  To put the Third Party Doctrine 
into context; I will trace the origins and original meaning of the Fourth Amendment as 
well as examine the temporal shift on the Supreme Court that lead to the creation of the 
doctrine.  
After exploring the trajectory Fourth Amendment law has taken leading up to 
and including the cases that established the Third-Party Doctrine I will examine how the 
doctrine itself has evolved over time and the implication current cases have had on it 
and Fourth Amendment law more generally.  In addition to examining how the laws and 
doctrine have changed, it will be critical noting the numerous societal changes that have 
occurred since the inception of the Third-Party Doctrine in order to determine if it is 
still worth being a part of Fourth Amendment Law. 
Since the establishment of the Third-Party Doctrine in the 1970’s an individual’s 
daily interaction with third-party providers has grown exponentially.  Some third-
parties, like banks, still hold roughly the same relationship with customers today that 
they did 35 years ago.  While other third-parties, such as telephone providers, have seen 
their relationship with clients change dramatically in the intervening period.  
Telecommunication companies have seen their relationship shift from a majority of 
consumers using a single landline utilized for the entire household, to individual cell 
                                                 
1 425 U.S. 435 (1976) 
2 442 U.S. 735 (1979) 
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phone lines for every member of the family.  Then there are new third-party companies 
to consider, such as internet service providers, which are unlike anything that existed in 
the 1970’s. 
At this point, one may wonder how a doctrine that seems to be so controversial 
could have come into being.  The answer is one that has not been examined in depth 
much at all because of the peculiar nature of the question.  The Third-Party Doctrine is 
widely reviewed by legal scholars, and it is in their nature to care less about how the 
doctrine came into being and more about its implications for jurisprudence.  From a 
political scientist’s perspective, determining what allowed the Third-Party Doctrine to 
come into being is a vital question that needs answering.  
To understand how this doctrine came into being it will be important to examine 
the shifts that occurred in the Supreme Court around the time the pivotal cases were 
decided.  In 1969, Richard Nixon was elected president of the United States as part of a 
reactionary wave of conservatives swept into office in part by campaigning against what 
was seen by some to be a liberal court.  From Nixon’s election in 1969 to the 
confirmation of Justice Stevens to the Supreme Court in 1975, there was a considerable 
conservative shift on the bench.   This new Supreme Court took it upon itself to bring a 
decidedly more conservative and strict constructionist tone to its decisions. It was a shift 
that lead to the creation of the Third-Party Doctrine. 
The digital revolution and everything that came with it forever changed how 
individuals interact with third-party providers.  Phone companies and Internet service 
providers (often one in the same now) have seen their relationship with customers reach 
unprecedented heights, while new services such as online social networking sites have 
4 
forever changed human interactions.  In the digital world, we live in today; it is no 
longer reasonable that the government can, without a warrant given upon probable 
cause or even reasonable suspicion and lacking particularity, access information from 
third-party providers at will.  
 
Chapter 2: Origin and Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
 The wish and recognition of privacy preceded the Fourth Amendment by 
millennia.  As early as the Babylonian Talmud of the Jews (3rd and 5th centuries) there 
was a recognition of privacy between neighbors.3  The Romans too shared this 
recognition for privacy as stated by Cicero, “(citizen’s homes) sacred… hedged about 
by every kind of sanctity.”4  Furthermore, under Emperor Justinian of Byzantium, 533 
C.E., a man could not be compelled from his home.  “Everyone’s safest place, his 
refuge and his shelter (is his home).”5   
 More closely related to the origin of the Fourth Amendment, British thinking on 
the right to privacy stretches far back as well.  As early as 1505 Chief Justice John 
Fineux of the Court of King’s Bench held, “the house of a man is for him and his castle 
and his defense.”6  This sentiment was echoed by multiple judges by 1616.7  While 
these statements prove that, in English thought, there was some expectation of privacy, 
the idea was not absolute.  While English courts believed that an individual’s house was 
                                                 
3 Baba Bathra, 2b-3a, 5a, 6b, 59a-60a, Talmud, Epstein ed., pt.4, vol. 3, pp. 2-4, 18-19, 24-25, 237-42. 
4 Cicero, “De Domo Sua Ad Pontifices Oratio,” XLI, 109 (29 September 57 B.C.E.), idem., The 
Speeches. Pro Archia Poeta. Post Reditum in Senatu (trans. By N.H. Watts, Cambridge and London, 
1923), pp. 45, 262-63. 
5 D. 2, 4, 18, The Civil Law, trans. By S.P. Scott (17 vols. In 7. Cincinnati, 1932), vol. 2, p. 275. 
6 Opinion of Chief Justice Sir John Fineux, Year Book, Michaelmas, 21 Henry VII, 39 (K.B. [Oct./Nov.] 
1505): De Termino Hilarii Anno XXI Henricii VII [London, 1530], fol, 41b, no. 50: “Nota.” 
7 Bettisworth’s Case (C.P. Easter 1591), 2 Coke 32a; 76 E.R. 1257, sec. 6. 
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off limits to his fellow man, the courts also made clear that when the king was a party 
nothing was off limits.8   
 
The Controversy over Writs of Assistance and General Warrants 
 While the benefits of the specific warrant over general warrants were well 
known by the 1750s, the time has still not progressed to a point where there was 
widespread acceptance.  In the colonies, these writs were used to allow agents of the 
King to search any person they believed to be involved in a crime, as well as any place 
they believed a crime has or is currently taking place.  On top of giving complete power 
to any official that possessed a writ, the writs themselves were valid for the life of the 
King that the writ was issued under.9  This means that once a writ was issued it could 
stand in effect for a decade or longer without any judicial input.   
These writs became so notorious in hindsight that in his opinion in Stanford v. 
Texas10, Justice Stewart referred to them as “hated writs” and explained that, “vivid in 
the memory of the newly independent Americans were those general warrants known as 
writs of assistance under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists.”  
The Paxton Case brought the issue of writs of assistance and general warrants to the 
forefront in the colonies.   
 The death of King George II on October 25, 1760, brought the situation in the 
colonies to a head with the writs issued under him set to expire six months after his 
death.  Before these writs could expire, Charles Paxton, a customs official in Boston, 
                                                 
8 Semayne’s Case (K.B. Michaelmas [Oct./Nov.] 1604), 5 Coke 91a at 91b, 93a; 77 E.R. 194 at 195, 198. 
Quote at 91b/195: “In all cases where the king is party the sheriff…may break the house…” 
9 Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, 54. 
10 379 US 476 (1965) 
6 
petitioned the Superior Court for new writs, which led a large group of merchants to ask 
the court to hear arguments against the new writs.  With a case granted the merchants 
hired the help of Oxenbridge Thatcher and James Otis Jr., while Jeremiah Gridley 
represented the customs officers.  The three briefs issued by the lawyers would lay out 
the arguments for and against issuing these new writs. 
 Grindley took the position that parliament’s word was supreme, and the statues 
passed clearly allowed the issuance of new writs.  His argument rested on the fact that, 
in 1662, the Fraud Act allowed such broad searches in England and later these searches 
were extended to the colonies in 1696.11  Grindley also referenced the ‘man’s home is 
his castle’ idiom saying, “The Subject has the (privilege) of House only against his 
fellow Subjects, not verses ye King either in matters of Crime or Fine.”12  However, 
times were changing, and even the idea that the King would open all the doors was 
evolving.   
 Thatcher’s brief, while still on the same side as Otis and the merchants, was 
limited to a few technical issues surrounding the issuance of new writs and their 
legality.13  Otis would grapple with the larger philosophical questions concerning the 
reasonableness of the writs in his brief. 
 In his brief, Otis directly challenged the assumptions of British search and 
seizure law and how it was operating within the colonies.  According to William J. 
Cuddihy, four key factors were explored in the Otis brief: “(1) Statute law defined writs 
of assistance as specific, not general, search warrants;(2) moreover, even if legislation 
                                                 
11 Brief of Gridley, Paxton’s Case (Mass. Sup. Ct. 22-24 Feb. 1761), Mass. Reports, Quincy ed., p.476; J. 
Adams, Works, vol. 2, p.522; idem., Legal Papers, vol. 2. 
12 Ibid 
13 Brief of Thacher, Paxton’s Case (Mass. Sup. Ct. 22-24 Feb. 1761), Mass. Reports, Quincy ed., p.p. 
469-70; J. Adams, Works, vol. 2, p.522; idem., Legal Papers, vol. 2. 
7 
encompassed general writs, practice had since rendered them specific;(3) legislation and 
practice notwithstanding, the English Constitution tolerated only specific warrants;(4) 
the unconstitutionality of the door-to-door searches in Massachusetts was independent 
of their constitutional standing elsewhere.”14  This brief would be fundamental in 
changing how the reasonableness of search and seizure would be considered in the 
colonies. 
 While a majority of the points Otis made in his brief stood on an uncertain legal 
ground at best, he still espoused a full-throated defense of an individual’s right to 
privacy; a point that would resonate within the colonists.  Otis also stated that, “…one 
of the most essential branches of English liberty is the freedom of one's house.  A man's 
house is his castle…. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate 
this privilege. Custom-house officers may enter our houses when they please… Bare 
suspicion without oath is sufficient.”15  Otis’s argument showed the gap that existed 
between the legal reality of the briefs and how they were put into practice in the 
colonies. 
 Otis even attempted to establish precedent for his views by recalling the decision 
in Bonham’s Case16 (1610).  Otis refers to the example from Charles Viner: “It appears 
in our books, that in several Cases the Common Law will controul Acts of Parliament 
and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; For where an Act of Parliament is 
against Common Right and Reason or repugnant or impossible to be performed, the 
                                                 
14 Cuddihy, William J. 2009. The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
15 “James Otis: Against Writs of Assistance.” 2015. Accessed October 13. 
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/writs 
16 Bonham’s Case (C.P. 1610), 8 Coke 113b, 118; 77 E.R. 646 at 652-53 
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common-law will controul it and adjudge it to be void.”17  While the Bonham Case 
appeared to support strongly Otis and the merchant’s, in the end, it was not enough.  
The case was lost, and the courts issued new writs.  
 While this trial was lost, the overall impact the Paxton Case would have on the 
development of search and seizure jurisprudence in the colonies would prove 
invaluable.  So much so that in 1886 the Supreme Court of the United States would 
state that the use of general warrants and writs of assistance were, “perhaps the most 
prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of 
the mother country.”18 
 Two years after the Paxton Case had brought the colonists’ attention to the grave 
danger that existed with general warrants, the Wilkes Case did the same in England.  In 
this case, a general warrant was used to break in twenty doors, numerous trucks, and 
hundreds of locks all while knocking over thousands of books, charts and manuscripts.19  
John Wilkes, an English newspaper publisher, had long been in opposition to the crown 
and critical of decisions that were made in the King’s name in his newspaper, The North 
Briton.  As Cuddihy recounts, “Within thirty hours time, a single warrant had facilitated 
the search of at least five houses and the arrest of some forty-nine persons, nearly all 
innocent.”20  A few years later, one individual involved in executing the general 
searches noted that it was not uncommon to take every piece of personal paper one 
                                                 
17 A General Abridgement of Law and Equity (23 Vols. Aldershot, 1742-56), vol. 19, pp. 512-13. 
18 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). 
19 David Snyder, The NSA's "General Warrants": How the Founding Fathers Fought an 18th Century 
Version of the President's Illegal Domestic Spying, 
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/generalwarrantsmemo.pdf 
20 Cuddihy, William J. 2009. The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
9 
could get their hands on during these searches if the political targets were valuable.21  
The Wilkes Case had garnered a considerable amount of attention in the colonies and 
would only further solidify the opposition to general warrants and writs of assistance. 
 As times changed, English intellectuals began to believe that there were 
differences between reasonable and unreasonable searches and seizures.  Cuddihy 
noted, “Between 1700 and 1760, ‘a man's house is his castle (except against the 
government) yielded to ‘a man's house is his castle (in particular against the 
government).”22  This reversal in thinking represented a pivotal shift that would lead 
down a path towards the Fourth Amendment.  Cuddihy continued, “the (Fourth) 
amendment’s most conspicuous feature, the specific warrant clause, a direct outgrowth 
of a multistage, century’s long rebellion against General warrants by British 
intellectuals that inspired all other facets of the amendment.”23  
 This account of the evolution and discussion that took place concerning privacy 
and general verses specific warrants serves to set the stage for how the individual states 
and Americans at large would come to view privacy and help shape the debate between 
specific and general warrants.  In the evolution of the discussion concerning privacy the 
inchoate ideas existed that would eventually become the Fourth Amendment. 
 
State Constitutions and Search and Seizure Policy 
 While the specific warrant was winning the battle with general warrants, the 
general warrant did not immediately fall out of favor in some jurisdictions in the newly 
                                                 
21 Opinion of Pratt, Entick v Carrington (C.P. [27 Nov.] 1765), S.T. vol., 19 (1753-71), p. 1065. 
22 Cuddihy, William J. 2009. The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
23 Ibid 
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formed states.  As in other areas of governance, there was a geographic difference in the 
application of specific versus general warrants, with specific warrants being more 
favored in the northern states and general warrants more favored in the south. 
 Cuddihy notes that “By 1784, Vermont and seven of those states (the thirteen 
separate states) had formulated constitutions with restrictions on search and seizure.”24  
The language of these various state constitutions would be the building blocks for The 
United States Constitution and The Bill of Rights.  For instance, section ten of The 
Virginia Declaration of Rights stated: “That general warrants, whereby an officer or 
messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact 
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not 
particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and 
ought not to be granted.”25  While this section does, in fact, authorize the use of general 
warrants, it also states that evidence must be presented for the warrant to be obtained 
and that particular offenses be named.  This section called for something of a mix 
between general and specific warrants. 
 Maryland’s Declaration of Rights, 1776, utilized similar language in its section 
twenty-three: “That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, 
or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general 
warrants-to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming 
or describing the place, or the person in special-are illegal, and ought not to be 
                                                 
24 Ibid 
25 “Bill of Rights - The Virginia Declaration of Rights.” 2015. Accessed October 27. 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/virginia_declaration_of_rights.html. 
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granted.”26  While some of the language is similar, there are a few key changes that 
make Maryland’s Constitution unique.  First, requiring an “oath or affirmation” be 
sworn increases protections.  Second, the section denounces the use of general warrants 
as “illegal”.   
 John Adams, a future president, would write the Massachusetts Constitution and 
in its section fourteen declare, “Every subject has a right to be secure from all 
unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his 
possessions.  All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation 
of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation…”27  Here is the first 
reference to “unreasonable searches, and seizures” that would later be a part of the 
Fourth Amendment.  The Massachusetts Constitution would also require an oath or 
affirmation to issue a warrant.   
While the language used in some of these state constitutions helped to establish 
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and aided in establishing ideas such 
as probable cause and particularity, when put into practice this language was not always 
followed. 
There were five states where the use of general warrants was still the go-to 
search method: New York, Maryland, North and South Carolina, and Georgia28.  
Despite the fact that, as stated above, Maryland and even North Carolina29 had adopted 
                                                 
26 “Constitution of Maryland - November 11, 1776.” 1998. Text. December 18. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 17th_century/ma02.asp. 
 
27 “Bill of Rights: Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, PT. 1.” 2015. Accessed October 27. http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss6.html. 
28 Cuddihy, William J. 2009. The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
29 “…without specially naming or describing the place or person, are dangerous, and ought not to be 
granted.” “Bill of Rights: North Carolina Ratifying Convention, Declaration of Rights and Other 
12 
constitutions that demonized the general search warrant it was still the most widely used 
method for searches. 
Other states were able to strike a balance between the use of general and specific 
warrants: New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.30  In these states, 
the use of general warrants was mostly reserved for when the police were searching for 
murderers and other high-level criminals.31  Still, a final group of states was able to lead 
the way for specific warrants. 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Delaware all used the specific 
warrant as their standard method of search and seizure.  The broad use of specific over 
general warrants in these states would prove that the specific warrant was, in fact, 
superior and would come to sweep the United States.  From the time of the Declaration 
of Independence in 1776 to the adoption of The Constitution of the United States in the 
summer of 1787 American search and seizure law underwent a revolution as well. 
This revolution created a fundamental separation between American and British 
law when it came to the topic of search and seizure.  In addition to favoring specific 
over general warrants in most state constitutions, other searches were prohibited as well.  
Unannounced searches, as well as those that took place at night, were also found to be 
unreasonable by various states.32  In the intervening period between 1776 and 1787 the 
specific warrant evolved from a possible option to use alongside general warrants to 
being its replacement.  This change would be solidified with the adoption of The 
                                                                                                                                               
Amendments.” 2015. Accessed October 27. http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss10.html. 
30 Cuddihy, William J. 2009. The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791. Oxford; 




Constitution of the United States and the The Bill of Rights, specifically, the Fourth 
Amendment.   
 
The Fourth Amendment Signals a Lasting Change 
 With the adoption of The Constitution, there was an implicit agreement that a 
bill of rights would be added at the meeting of the first Congress.  On June 8th, 1789 
James Madison would present a rough draft of a bill of rights that included an 
amendment dealing with search and seizure.  His original draft stated, “The rights of the 
people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property 
from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued 
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing 
the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.”33  Looking back, one 
can see the structure of what would become the Fourth Amendment lives in this 
passage. 
 Moving forward there would be many changes made to the language of the 
proposed amendment.  Various committees would add and subtract phrases at will to 
appease differing factions.  Three months later, after a conference committee on 
September 25th, 1789 Congress agreed on the final language of what was, at the time, 
the sixth amendment.34  When the first two proposed amendments did not get the 
                                                 
33 “Proposed Amendments to the Constitution < James Madison < Presidents < American History From 
Revolution To Reconstruction and beyond.” 2015. Accessed October 28. 
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/james-madison/proposed-amendments-to-the-constitution.php 
34 Procs., 21 and 24 Sept. 1789, U.S. House of Representatives, Jnl., 1789, pp. 146, 152; reprinted: 
D.H.F.F.C., vol. 3, pp. 217, 227 at 228. Procs., 21 and 24 Sept. 1789, U.S. Senate, Jnl., 1789, pp. 142, 
145, 148; reprinted D.H.F.F.C., vol. 1, pp. 180 at 181, 185 at 189. 
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necessary support to be ratified, they were dropped, and the amendment concerning 
search and seizure took its current place at fourth. 
 The final language of the amendment lasts through to today stating: “The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.35 
 With the origin of the Fourth Amendment explored, it is now imperative to 
attempt to understand the original meaning of the amendment.  At the time of the 
amendment’s adoption the framers and their constituents had a mutual understanding of 
what was a reasonable and unreasonable search or seizure.  That understanding has 
changed and evolved; however, reaching back to understand the original meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment is vital to appreciate how and why the Third Party Doctrine that 
exists today is unacceptable under the Fourth Amendment. 
 At the time, three categories of searches were thought to be unreasonable: 
general warrants (including those related to it), night searches, and unannounced 
searches.  Within the language of the amendment, a stricter burden was placed on 
searches over seizures.  This specificity is shown by the fact that in the particularity 
clause, a warrant must describe a place, singular, to be searched; however, it may list 
persons or things, plural, to be seized.   
 This language illustrates that, at the time, citizens wanted to restrict searches by 
the government more so than arrests and seizures.  To them, general searches of 
multiple properties represented the greatest threat to a person’s liberty, freedom, and 
                                                 
35 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
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privacy.  Along with the consensus that general warrants were unreasonable, searches at 
night were also agreed to be so.  Laws in multiple states such as Massachusetts36, New 
Hampshire37, Connecticut38, Rhode Island39, New York40, Pennsylvania41, New 
Jersey42, Maryland43, Virginia44, North45 and South46 Carolina, and Georgia47, all 
outlawed nocturnal searches.  These searches were largely seen as inconvenient and 
unnecessary to execute adequately the laws of the land.  The final category of searches 
deemed unreasonable at the time was unannounced searches.   
 As with nocturnal searches the unannounced or so-called “no-knock” searches 
were first legislated against on a state-by-state basis and not prohibited by The 
Constitution.  However, with the passage of The Judiciary Act of 178948, federal 
officers were required to go through the legal processes in their states thus effectively 
ending the use of “no-knock” warrants.  It is important to point out these three types of 
searches because it shows that at the time of the adoption of The Bill of Rights, these 
are the kinds of searches thought to be unreasonable by a majority of people in the 
United States. 
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 When breaking down these concerns and the language of the Fourth 
Amendment, it is clear that the first clause, declaring protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, is more memorable than the later section evoking particularity or 
denouncing general warrants.  To Cuddihy, this is because “the framers of the 
amendment were less concerned with the right against general warrants than with the 
broader rights those warrants infringed.”49  Privacy was the general right that the 
framers were hoping to protect for generations to come.   
 In the 1780s general warrants were not seen as unreasonable just because they 
allowed broad searches, but because they were a fundamental threat to privacy.  By 
stating that all, not just people, but houses, papers, and effects were protected from 
unreasonable search and seizure the framers then went on to insist that warrants only be 
issued when an individual would swear that there was cause for such and that any 
warrant issued be narrowly drawn, particularly describing persons and places, so as to 
limit the invasion of privacy for citizens. 
 Some scholars may look at the Fourth Amendment and find it lacking in clarity 
and specifics as to what types of searches are reasonable and unreasonable and if 
particular situations may change what is or is not reasonable; however, these scholars 
are missing that point.  In the minds of the framers what was considered unreasonable 
was very clear to them.  Seared into the public consciousness were the writs of 
assistance and general searches that occurred in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, 
and across the colonies when under British rule.   
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 These memories made it clear that it was of paramount importance to prohibit 
the use of general warrants at all costs.  Cuddihy speaks to this in his closing paragraph: 
“To lament the ambiguities on probable cause, search incident to arrest, and remedies 
for violation that characterized the original amendment is to fault its authors for not 
anticipating the constitutional issues of later centuries. The amendment succeeded 
spectacularly in its most obvious purpose, to keep general warrants out of the hands of 
the federal government.”50 
 The foresight of the framers in aiming to protect against the evils of general 
warrants would however not last forever.  In the 1970s the Third-Party Doctrine would 
effectively open the door to possible abuse by the government.  With an understanding 
of the origins and original meaning of the Fourth Amendment, one can now better judge 
the reasonableness of what came to be known as the Third-Party Doctrine. 
 
Chapter 3: Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
 Two key features make up the critical components of the Third-Party Doctrine: 
the assumption of risk theory and the so-called secrecy model of privacy.  Richard M. 
Thompson II, a legislative attorney, detailed in a report by the Congressional Research 
Service that, “under the secrecy model, once a fact is disclosed to the public in any way, 
the information is no longer entitled to privacy protection.”51  While this sentiment was 
again expressed in Katz, the idea had long been a part of the Court’s thinking.  
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51 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Fourth Amendment Third-Party 
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 The Court had long deemed the packaging of a parcel of mail52 as well as items 
in “plain view” 53 of the public not to have protection under the Fourth Amendment.  
This idea would grow through multiple cases in the 20th century that an individual has 
no reasonable expectation that someone they shared information with would not later 
give that information to authorities.  As Thompson notes, this thinking would later be 
extended to transactional data and documents shared with third parties under the Third-
Party Doctrine.54   
 With an understanding of what was most important to the framers of the Fourth 
Amendment and the citizens that voted for its ratification, it will be significant to 
highlight next the development of Fourth Amendment as it will come to pertain to the 
Third-Party Doctrine.  Knowing when Fourth Amendment protections are activated by 
governmental actions is paramount to this endevor.  To understand this one must figure 
out what is and is not considered a search as well as the assumption of risk theory. 
 
The Assumption of Risk Theory 
 In a line of cases that would occur both before and after Katz, the Court would 
refine its thinking concerning the assumption of risk in undercover informant cases.  In 
1952, On Lee v. United States55, the owner of a laundromat was visited by an 
undercover agent wearing a microphone in an attempt to record incriminating 
conversations.  When the agent testified at On Lee’s trial, the defense tried to get the 
evidence thrown out as an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment.  In the Court’s 
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decision, Justice Jackson reasoned that since On Lee talked willingly and indiscreetly 
with the agent and that since the agent was let into laundromat freely that there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation.56   
 Eleven years later in Lopez v. United States57, an individual tried to bribe an IRS 
agent who was recording the conversation.  Again the defense attempted to claim this 
was an illegal search, and again the Court stated that since the conversation was had 
willingly and there was no trespass involved that the recording was legal.58  In two more 
cases, Lewis v. United States59 and Hoffa v. United States60, the Courts ruled that the use 
of undercover agents and the conversations had with them permissible.   
 The cases above all had two central beliefs in play.  The first was that under 
Olmsted’s physical trespass test each agent was freely able, if not invited, to enter the 
defendant’s business, home, or other possibly constitutionally protected area.  Secondly, 
since the defendants all engaged in conversations willingly, there was no search under 
the Fourth Amendment.  For example, in the Hoffa decision Justice Stewart wrote, 
“Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth 
Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he 
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”61   
 It is worth noting that all of the cases mentioned above were decided before the 
Court moved away from Olmsted’s line of thinking with its decision in Katz.  With the 
shift away from a strict physical trespass interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, there 
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60 385 U.S. 293, 296 (1966). the 
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was the possibility of change.  However, in United States v. White62, the Court did not 
change course.  In the opinion, Justice White reaffirmed, “a police agent who conceals 
his police connections may write down for official use his conversations with a 
defendant and testify concerning them without a warrant authorizing his encounters 
with the defendant and without otherwise violating the latter's Fourth Amendment 
rights.”63  While the trespass rationale was overturned, individuals still had no 
expectation of privacy with what they voluntarily shared, and they assumed the risk that 
the information may be given to the government.  With the assumption of risk theory 
analyzed one must understand what is considered a search requiring Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
 
Early Conceptions of a “Search” under the Fourth Amendment 
 After the adoption of the of the Fourth Amendment, it would take nearly one 
hundred years before the Supreme Court would take up the question of what constitutes 
a search under the Fourth Amendment.  United States v. Boyd64 in 1886 would provide 
this opportunity.  In this case, Boyd was required, by a court order, to present 
documents detailing the value and goods that he was importing under the suspicion that 
they were attempting to falsify the paperwork to avoid paying duties and fees.   
 The Boyd family complied. However, they claimed that forcing them to turn 
over these documents represented an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Court agreed with the Boyd and found that forcing one to turn over documents was 
analogous to a search under the Fourth Amendment.  Furthermore, in delivering the 
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opinion, Justice Bradley stated: “…constitutional provisions for the security of person 
and property should be liberally construed.  A close and literal construction deprives 
them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right as if it 
consisted more in sound than in substance.”65  He went on to stress, “it is the duty of the 
courts to be watchful…. Their motto should be obsta principiis”66.67   
 Unfortunately, some forty-two years later the Court decided Olmstead v. U.S.68 
in 1928 and significantly contradicted what would be considered a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.  In Olmstead, federal agents were attempting to put an end to a 
bootlegging operation and in the process placed several wiretaps on multiple suspects’ 
private phone lines without a judge’s approval.  This case was decided 5-4 for the 
United States Government. 
 Chief Justice Taft delivered the majority opinion of the Court.  In this judgment, 
the majority found that, because the Fourth Amendment “shows that the search is to be 
of material things -- the person, the house, his papers, or his effects”69 intangible voices 
are not protected.  Furthermore, as the federal agents did not cross onto any of the 
defendant’s property, that there was no “actual physical invasion”70 So Fourth 
Amendment protections did not apply, this created what became known as the trespass 
theory.  While there may have been a majority of justices in agreement, there was also 
strong opposition.  
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 Three justices, Brandeis, Butler, and Stone all wrote dissenting opinions with 
Justice Holmes writing a separate opinion to add slightly to Brandeis’s dissent.  Out of 
all of these dissents, Justice Brandeis’s is the one that had the greatest lasting effect.  
One of the most important points in Brandeis’s dissent was pointing out that in earlier 
decisions, such as the one in Boyd, the Court did not place “an unduly literal 
construction71” upon Fourth Amendment protections.   
 Additionally, Brandeis continued: “The makers of our Constitution undertook to 
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness…. They conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights, and the right 
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”72  This stern dissent had little affect at 
the time as the Court continued to use the physical trespass standard for years after this 
case.   
 Decades later a shift would happen in the application of the Fourth Amendment.  
In 1967, Katz v United States73 would be decided and alter the course yet again.  This 
case arose when FBI agents were investigating illegal gambling activity. With Mr. Katz 
as their primary suspect, they noted that he would frequently make calls from a 
telephone booth.  To obtain evidence, the agents attached an electronic wiretapping 
device to the pay phone without getting a search warrant.  Under the logic used in 
Olmsted, this action would appear to be entirely legal within Fourth Amendment 
parameters.   
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 Unfortunately for the FBI, the Court decided to move past the logic in Olmsted 
and articulate new guidelines for Fourth Amendment protections.  Justice Stewart 
delivered the opinion of the Court stating, “the Fourth Amendment governs not only the 
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, 
overheard without any ‘technical trespass under . . . local property law.’74”75  Steward 
continued, “For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.  What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”76  With this decision 
the old “trespass doctrine” articulated in Olmsted was no longer the guiding light for the 
Courts in Fourth Amendment cases. 
 Equally important to the overall decision, in this case, was Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion.  In this concurrence, Justice Harlan would introduce a two-pronged 
test to determine whether an individual had a right to Fourth Amendment protections or 
not.  He stated, “My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is 
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’"77  This concurring opinion would lead to the 
creation of the expectation of privacy test. 
 This test contains two hurdles. First, an individual must have an actual 
expectation of privacy.  If it is proven that they indeed do then the second question, 
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whether that expectation of privacy is one that society recognizes as legitimate, must be 
answered.  If the response to both is yes, then Fourth Amendment protections apply.  In 
Katz, the fact that the individual closed the phone booth door and paid the fee for the 
call gave him a reasonable expectation that the call would not be overheard and 
according to the justices, this expectation of privacy was one society would recognize as 
rational.   
 Both in Stewart’s majority and Harlan’s concurrence the idea of privacy was 
fluid.  Stewart, as noted earlier said, “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”78  Harlan 
agreed that, “conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, 
for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.”79  
These statements show that while the Court was willing to strengthen protections under 
the Fourth Amendment, privacy was not all encompassing. It is these two key points, as 
well as the recent conservative swing in the Supreme Court that would lead to the 
creation of the Third-Party Doctrine.    
 In the years following this decision the composition of the court would change 
dramatically taking a more conservative tone.  Chief Justice Warren Burger replaced 
Chief Justice Earl Warren.  Justices Abe Fortas and William Douglas also left the Court 
and were replaced by Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens.  Also, possibly 
one of the most significant departures was that of Justice Harlan, who created the two-
pronged expectation of privacy test in his momentous concurring decision in Katz.  His 
seat went to the very conservative William Rehnquist.  With this new composition of 
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justices, the Court would yet again change when the Fourth Amendment would come 
into play.  To understand why the changing makeup of the Supreme Court has an effect 
on the decisions it makes, it is important to understand the various theories that exist 
concerning judicial decision-making and to recognize that the Supreme Court can affect 
real change.  
 
Chapter 4: The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court as a Policy Maker   
 It is important to introduce the idea that the Supreme Court is a policy-making 
institution.  This idea was first expertly analyzed by Robert Dahl in his 1957 seminal 
work, “Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker.”  To give an idea of how influential Dahl’s work was and still is, in 2001 
Epstein, Knight, and Martin found that, “From its publication, the Dahl Article has been 
cited by both social science journals and law reviews every year to date.”80  Given this 
widespread scholarly attention, Dahl’s work is surely worth contemplation here.  A key 
aspect of Dahl’s work was his idea of the ruling regime. 
 With the belief that politics in the Unites States are dominated by alliances that 
work to attain a common goal for long periods of time, (e.g. the Jeffersonian Era, 
Jacksonian Era, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal era) Dahl would argue that judicial 
decision making would fall in line with what he called the ruling regime.   
 The ruling regime is explained by Dahl: “Except for short-lived transitional 
periods when the old alliance is disintegrating and the new one is struggling to take 
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control of political institutions, the Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the dominant 
national alliance.  As an element in the political leadership of the dominant alliance, the 
Court of course supports the major policies of the alliance”81.  Dahl believed this to be 
so because of the unique way Supreme Court justices are appointed to the bench via 
nomination and confirmation. 
 For a Supreme Court justice to be appointed he/she must first be nominated by 
the President of the United States; as one can imagine this selection process involves a 
significant amount of scrutinizing.  Furthermore, once a candidate is selected he/she is 
then introduced to the United States Senate where, after moving past the judiciary 
committee, a majority must vote to confirm the justice for him/her to be appointed to 
the bench.  Since it is doubtful that a president would nominate a justice who did not 
share his views and even more improbable that a majority of senators would confirm a 
nominee who did not share a majority of their points of view this process helps to 
ensure that a majority viewpoint is upheld with every nomination and confirmation.   
 In their work, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited, Segal 
and Spaeth argue that there are “five interrelated features of the Constitution that enable 
federal courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, to function as 
authoritative policy makers.”82  These five points are a fundamental law, distrust of 
governmental power, federalism, separation of powers, and judicial review.  As they 
explain:  
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The Constitution is the fundamental law establishes it as the 
benchmark from which legitimacy of all governmental action is to be 
judged. The popular belief that the government that governs least 
governs best has produced and abiding distrust of government, 
politicians, and bureaucrats… constitutional division of governmental 
power between the states and Washington, as well as that among the 
three branches of the federal government, requires some entity to resolve 
the conflicts such divisions and separations produces.  By its enunciation 
of the doctrine of judicial review in Marbury v Madison, the Supreme 
Court arrogated to itself the authority to guard against subversion of the 
fundamental law to concomitantly resolve the conflicts that federalism 
and separation of powers produce83.   
 
Taking Dahl’s ruling regime thesis and Segal and Spaeth’s five points into account 
there is a convincing argument in place that the Supreme Court is, in fact, a policy-
making entity.   
 
Is Dahl’s ruling regime still relevant? 
 For those who are apprehensive with the fact that an unelected body of nine 
justices can have the final say with regards to the constitutionality of statutes created 
and signed into law by elected officials Dahl’s ruling regimes theory would seem to put 
those nerves at ease.  Under the ruling regimes theory, Dahl estimated that a president 
would have the opportunity to make great changes concerning the Supreme Court.  
“Over the whole history of the Court, on the average one new justice has been 
appointed every twenty-two months. Thus a president can expect to appoint about two 
new Justices during one term of office; and if this were not enough to tip the balance on 
a normally divided Court, he is almost certain to succeed in two terms.”84  With new 
nominations come new confirmations, and if the nominations succeed then the views of 
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the new justices will be acceptable by a majority of elected officials and thus cause no 
problems.  
 Dahl even believe that the Supreme Court was so integrated with the ruling 
regime that it acted as mechanism to confer legitimacy across the board saying, “the 
Court operates to confer legitimacy, not simply on the particular and parochial policies 
of the dominant political alliance, but upon the basic patterns of behavior required for 
the operation of a democracy.”85  He held this belief because it is not often that the 
Court would go against the viewpoint held by the majority.  However, this article was 
originally published in 1957 and perhaps some things have changed since then.   
 Starting with John F. Kennedy in 1961 there have been ten presidents appointing 
twenty justices to the Supreme Court.  Of those ten presidents, only two were on pace 
with Dahl’s calculations.  Richard Nixon appointed four justices to the bench in his just 
over five years in office, while George H. W. Bush was on pace appointing two justices 
in his one term as president.  President Reagan came close to meeting Dahl’s criteria 
with three appointments.  However, Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Lyndon 
Johnson, and John Kennedy only appointed two justices each.  Gerald Ford appointed 
one, and Jimmy Carter appointed none.   
 Presently Barack Obama has appointed two justices to the Supreme Court; 
however, with the sudden passing of Justice Antonin Scalia there is a possibility that he 
will be appointing a third.  If President Obama is successful in his nomination of 
Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court, it will be the first time a president has appointed 
a third justice to the Court since Ronald Reagan succeeded in getting Anthony Kennedy 
confirmed in February of 1988.  All of this does not completely nullify Dahl’s idea of 
                                                 
85Ibid. 
29 
the ruling regime; justices still must be tolerable to a majority of elected officials at the 
time of their nomination to be confirmed.  The only difference now is the election of 
younger justices to the high court that serve on the Court longer makes it possible for 
the Court to be less in line with the ruling regime now than in the past.   
 
Models of Judicial Decision Making   
 Once a justice is on the bench scholars have attempted to come up with the 
perfect model to explain why a justice will vote a certain way.  Over the years, many 
models have been proposed and tested by scholars that attempted to account for the 
process of judicial decision making.  Among these are: The Legal model, the Strategic 
Model, and the Attitudinal Model.  These models have raised popular and hotly 
contested issues in the literature concerning judicial decision-making.  These models are 
not perfect representations of reality, merely an oversimplification that focuses on a few 
key factors to frame the overall picture of the Supreme Court. 
 The first model, the Legal Model, can be easily explained by Tracey George and 
Lee Epstein.  “At its core, legalism centers around a rather simple assumption about 
judicial decision making, namely, that legal doctrine, generated by past cases, is the 
primary determinant of extant case outcomes.”86  This model is the most simplistic as it 
can boil down to the use of stare decisis87.  This aspect of modern jurisprudence is the 
idea that if a question has previously been brought before the Court and a definitive 
ruling issued, the Court will stand by the prior ruling.  However, this is not always the 
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case; courts have from time to time reversed precedent as has been seen concerning 
Fourth Amendment law. 
 Another model is referred to as the Strategic Model.  Epstein and Knight in their 
book, The Choices Justices Make, explain their strategic model saying, “Justices may be 
primarily seekers of legal policy, but they are not unconstrained actors who make 
decisions based only on their own ideological attitudes.  Rather, justices are strategic 
actors who realize that their ability to achieve their goals depends on a consideration of 
the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the 
institutional context in which they act”88.   
 In their words, Epstein and Knight explain that the strategic decision-making 
model rests on three broad assumptions.  First, justices’ actions are directed toward the 
attainment of goals.  Second, justices are strategic.  Third, institutions structure justices’ 
interactions89.  The strategic model holds that justices strive to see their preferred policy 
positions become the law of the land.  Epstein and Knight do concede that justices do 
have other goals beyond policy, such as sustaining the institutional legitimacy of the 
Court; however, most scholars see this as only a peripheral goal to obtaining preferred 
policy positions.   
 Another component of the strategic model involves how the model got its name, 
strategic interactions among justices and other actors.  Particularly for those justices on 
the Supreme Court, deciding cases is a group effort.  Some lower courts only have a 
single justice, and he/she only needs to consider how a ruling might be appealed or 
viewed by outside actors.  However, with the Supreme Court, there are nine justices 
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each with his/her policy preferences and values.  Here the model dictates that a justice 
must take into account how other justices will act to decide how they will act. 
 Epstein and Knight explain, “(A justice) acts in a way that does not accurately 
reflect their true preferences so as to avoid the possibility of seeing his colleagues reject 
his most preferred policy in favor of his least preferred.”90  Along with this strategic 
thinking inside the court, justices must likewise consider the strategic viewpoints of 
outside actors.  If the president or Congress’s preferred policy positions are too far from 
where the Court rules, they risk a new law being written to counter them, or worse, 
outright opposition to the decision. Furthermore, public opinion is also a source of 
legitimacy for the Court and must be taken into account when a controversial case is at 
hand.  
 The final model of judicial decision making and perhaps the most helpful in 
explaining the shift that occurred between the late 1960s and mid-1970s, is the 
attitudinal model.  Judges are often held in high esteem, especially so at the level of the 
Supreme Court.  However, they are, after all, human and thus possess their personal 
biases that can affect how a case is decided.  Segal and Spaeth introduce the model 
claiming that it ties together key concepts from legal realism, political science, 
psychology, and economics.  
 They maintain that “This model holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes 
in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the 
justices.”91  In other words, liberally leaning justices vote liberally because they 
maintain such ideological attitudes and vice-versa for conservatively leaning justices. 
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With this model come certain goals, rules, and situations that are assumed for the 
Attitudinal Model to be completely effective.  Rhode and Spaeth state that “actors in 
political situations are outcome oriented; when they choose among a number of 
alternatives, they pick that which they perceive will yield them the greatest net benefit 
in terms of their goals.”92  This idea that justices are goal-oriented actors fits squarely 
within the rational choice paradigm in political science.   
 Next, Rhode and Spaeth speak of the rules that govern actors within the 
attitudinal model, including “The various formal and informal rules and norms within 
the framework of which decisions are made.  As such, they specify which types of 
actions are permissible and which are impermissible, the circumstance and conditions 
under which choice may be exercised, and the manner of choosing”93.  With constraints 
and utility maximization the strategic model likely falls into the rational choice variant 
of institutionalism.  
 The use of the attitudinal model helps to explain that as liberal-leaning justices 
were replaced with conservative-leaning justices, the decisions handed down by the 
Supreme Court became decidedly more conservative and the attitudes of the newly 
appointed justices help to account for the shift that occurred thus making the creation of 
the Third-Party Doctrine more likely.  
 
Chapter 5: Conservative Backlash Sets up the Third-Party Doctrine 
 As previously stated, there was a wave of conservative idealism that swept 
through the United States around the 1969 election that culminated in the election of 
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Richard Nixon as president.  In Vincent Blasi’s edited volume The Burger Court: the 
counter-revolution that wasn’t chapter four by Yale Kamisar describes the situation 
thusly, “It was not the Warren Court’s efforts to strengthen the rights of the accused in 
the courtroom but its ‘activism’ in the search and seizure, police interrogation, and 
pretrial notification areas that lead many to believe that it was too soft on crime and 
made this a major political issue in the 1968 presidential campaign.”94   
 With the addition of Justices Powell, Blackmun, Stevens, Rehnquist and Chief 
Justice Burger the Supreme Court was set to make reactionary decisions.  Yale 
Kamisar, speaking when the Burger Court was in session, already saw the negative 
impact of the decisions it was making. “Even more disquieting than the manner in 
which the present Court has narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule is the way in 
which it has narrowed the substantial protection provided by the fourth amendment. By 
taking a crabbed view of what constitutes a ‘search’ or ‘seizure,’ the court has put no 
constitutional restraints at all on certain investigative techniques that may uncover an 
enormous quantity of personal information.”95   
 
Nixon and the Supreme Court 
 Utilizing what is known about the different models to analyze judicial decision-
making will only yield a partial picture when it comes to the Supreme Court.  Before a 
justice can take their place on the bench and their opinions come into play, they must 
first be nominated and confirmed.  This has lead authors like Skowronek to come up 
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with a theory concerning presidential authority regarding political time and others 
(Whittington and McMahon) related it to judicial behavior.   
 Skowronek determined that there are four distinct political facets of political 
time: reconstruction, articulation, disjunction, and preemption.96  Utilizing this research 
McMahon hypothesized that “in comparison to Segal and Spaeth’s Attitudinal Model, 
the notions of political time and political regimes provide greater clarity about the link 
between presidential authority and both the timing of contentious Supreme Court 
appointments and their success or failure.”97  While Segal and Spaeth’s attitudinal 
model is suited to help explain judicial decision-making, Skowronek’s model can help 
explain the type of justice a president is likely to nominate and the likelihood of their 
confirmation.  
 Since the conservative shift in the Court that leads to the creation of the Third-
Party Doctrine occurred during Nixon’s tenure, it would be wise to apply Skowronek, 
McMahon and others theories to Nixon’s appointments and see what information can be 
gleaned.   According to Skowronek’s classifications, Nixon was a preemptive president. 
Preemptive presidents are described by Skowronek as: 
Interrupting a still vital political discourse in trying to preempt its agenda 
by playing upon the political divisions within the establishment that 
affiliated presidents instinctively seek to assuage. Their programs are 
designed to aggravate interest cleavages and factional discontent within 
the dominant coalition, for therein lies the prospect of broadening their 
base of support and sharpening their departure from the received 
formulas.98 
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This section goes a long way in describing the actions Nixon took as president with his 
appointments to the Supreme Court.  
 One of the key issues during the 1969 presidential election was the Supreme 
Court, which Nixon brought to the forefront.  Emphasizing what he believed to be 
decisions that were soft on crime, Nixon made it clear that he wanted to, at the very 
least, slow down the Courts.  The “interest cleavages” and “fractional discontent” that 
Skowronek spoke of were Southern Democrats, and Nixon was determined to do what 
he could to bring about change.   
 McMahon explains that the first of the two ways in which preemptive presidents 
will use Supreme Court appointments is to broaden their base and go against the 
established regime.  “Richard Nixon’s search for a Southern strict constructionist 
represents the best example of the first strategy.”99  The importance of this pursuit for a 
Southern strict constructionist was two-fold.  First, as McMahon suggested for a 
preemptive president, an attempt to appeal to Southern Democrats in an effort to 
broaden the base of the Republican party in the South, which at the time was feeling 
disconnected with the direction of the Democratic party.  Secondly, a strict 
constructionist would, as Nixon promised, help put an end to what he saw as judicial 
activism on the Court.   
 Later in his book, Nixon’s Court: His Challenge to Judicial Liberalism and Its 
Political Consequences, McMahon would emphasize that, “Nixon’s administration 
focused on those constitutional concerns that appeared to have the most significant 
electoral payoff for the president, those that would likely advance his desire for a ‘New 
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American Majority’.”100  Through time it is clear that this was a winning strategy that 
helped pave the way for Reagan-Democrats and pockets of conservatives being elected 
in the urban north.   
 Along with the future electoral successes Nixon’s strategy would bring, his 
choices would also greatly affect the Court.  Combining Segal and Spaeth’s attitudinal 
model and Skowronek’s political regime approach one can conclude that because Nixon 
was a preemptive president looking for justices that would hold strict constructionism as 
their guiding judicial philosophy, he placed justices on the Supreme Court that would 
ultimately lead to the creation of the Third-Party Doctrine when presented with the 
appropriate cases.  Simply put, Nixon was a law and order president and nominated 
certain justices that fit his preferences or attitude concerning law and order. 
 
 The Third-Party Doctrine in Academia 
 The Third-Party Doctrine is an issue that has a fair amount of academic writing 
behind it.  This scholarship has largely focused on the question of whether or not the 
Third-Party Doctrine is good law and deserves to still exist in a rapidly changing digital 
age.  This question, while valid (and even touched on in this piece), needs background 
before it can be properly answered.   
 As previously stated, The Third-Party Doctrine is a subject that is largely 
examined by legal scholars.  Of the notable authors that have examined this issue, Kerr, 
Slobogin, Blasi, Kamisar, Nojeim, and Henderson all are legal scholars that have 
examined the issue from a legal perspective.  In order to get a clearer picture of the 
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doctrine taking a look at what allowed the creation of the doctrine in the first place 
brings a fresh prospective to the subject.  
 Looking at the Third-party Doctrine from a political science perspective 
highlighting the circumstances that led to change is important for an overall 
understanding of the subject.  By pinpointing the circumstances that created the 
conditions that made the doctrine possible a new comprehension on the subject is more 
likely to emerge.  The conservative shift of the Court represented a dynamic change in 
how the Court would come to decide cases.    
 
Visual Representations of Supreme Court Shifts 
 To present the clearest picture of the changes that occurred in the Supreme 
Court, it is best to use a visual medium.  Along with being able to visualize the changes 
that took place with the Court, having each Supreme Court justice rated according to 
their ideological dispositions will further help to clarify the shift.  For the visual 
mediums, two separate graphs will be used.  One that uses Bailey Scores for justices 
and another that uses the Martin-Quinn scores for ideological leanings. 
 The Bailey Scores are named for Professor Michael A. Bailey of Georgetown 
University.  His graph was originally published in June of 2012.  This scale rates 
Supreme Court justices on a half point basis with 0.0 being centrist, 1.5 being most 
conservative, and 2.0 being most liberal.  This graph covers justices from 1950 through 
2011.  
 Martin-Quinn Scores refer to work done by Andrew D. Martin of the University 
of Michigan and Kevin M. Quinn from the University of California Berkeley School of 
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Law.  The graph used runs through the 2014 October Term.  This scale also uses 0 as a 
center with the most conservative number reaching 6 and the most liberal number being 
7.  Their data runs from 1935 through 2014 and also uses a yellow median justice line 
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 Both graphs have been edited to highlight the time when the period in question 
the Supreme Court saw a decided shift to the right.  Also, each has been color coded, so 
the graphs match.  Blue lines denote outgoing, more liberally leaning justices, while red 
lines represent incoming more conservatively leaning justices.  More liberally and more 
conservatively leaning is used instead of a definitive liberal and conservative label 
because of Justice Stevens.  When he first joined the Court, the Baily Score had him 
slightly liberal, and the Martin-Quinn score had him as a centrist. 
 Justice Stevens was also the last of the five highlighted justices to join the Court 
so his inclusion in the list might be puzzling seeing as how he was a centrist in his early 
years on the Court and grew more liberal over time.  He is included mainly because of 
the justice he replaced.  In 1957, Justice Stevens was confirmed to replace Justice 
Douglas, one of the most liberal justices to ever sit on the Court.  Along with Justice 
Stevens as a replacement, it may be curious to some why Justice Harlan is on the list.   
 Justice Harlan’s Bailey Score placed him as a centrist when he departed, and his 
Martin-Quinn score was slightly conservative.  His placement on this list is important 
for a few reasons.  First, his replacement, Justice Rehnquist, was one of the most 
conservative justices ever to sit on the bench, especially in his first decade on the bench.  
Second, in his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan expressed a willingness to 
extend Fourth Amendment protections beyond what was considered reasonable in past 
decisions.  Another meaningful shift that occurred at the time was the transition of 
Chief Justices. 
 In 1969, then Chief Justice Earl Warren reluctantly retired leaving new President 
Nixon to appoint Warren Burger the new Chief Justice.  This change in the in Chief 
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Justices represented a drastic shift for the Court.  Warren was one of the most liberal 
Chief Justices the Court had ever seen, and Burger was one of the most conservative.  
With all of the changes in individual justices, it is important to note the overall effect on 
the Court. 
Before the changes in membership on the Supreme Court, in 1969, the median 
Bailey Score was a -1.0, indicating a clearly liberal lean.  The Martin-Quinn Score for 
that same period was also -1, again showing a liberal lean, however not quite as much.  
After all of the highlighted changes in membership had taken place the Baily Score for 
the median justices had risen to just over 0.0, indicating a just right of center lean.  The 
Martin-Quinn score can be estimated at a 0.5, again indicating a right of center lean in 
the Court.  These indicators make it clear that the change in membership would lead to 
more conservative judicial thinking.  
 
Chapter 7: The Third-Party Doctrine is Born 
Miller v. United States 
 Miller v. United States103 was the first case the Court examined involving 
transactional documents that would begin to solidify the rationale behind the Third-
Party Doctrine.  In this case, Miller was suspected and charged with possession of 
distilling equipment and alcohol that had not had taxes paid on it.  In the course of the 
investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) issued subpoenas 
for Miller’s bank records.  Two banks, Citizens & Southern National Bank of Warner 
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Robins and the Bank of Byron complied and turned over paperwork that was used at 
Miller’s trial.  This information helped lead to his conviction. 
 Upon this conviction, Miller appealed the decision on the grounds that his 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the bank turned over the paperwork.  The 
Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals determined that his rights were 
violated and overturned the conviction.  Following this successful appeal, the 
government then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.  The question concerning 
the Court was seemingly simple, were the bank records illegally seized under the Fourth 
Amendment? 
 In an overwhelming 7-2 decision, the Court found that Miller had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy concerning his original checks and deposit slips.  Justice Powell 
delivered the opinion of the Court.  In his opinion, he made the case that, “On their face, 
the documents subpoenaed here are not respondent's ‘private papers.’… Instead, these 
are the business records of the banks.”104  He continued: 
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks and deposit slips, 
rather than to the microfilm copies actually viewed and obtained by 
means of the subpoena, we perceive no legitimate "expectation of 
privacy" in their contents. The checks are not confidential 
communications, but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial 
transactions. All of the documents obtained, including financial 
statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily 
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary 
course of business... This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a 
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a 
limited purpose, and the confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed.105 
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In this section of the opinion, the Court is expressing multiple ideas that are important. 
First is the notion that, because Miller voluntarily conducted business with the banks, 
the information he gave them could then be used by the banks in any way they see fit.  
Secondly, the final sentence would come to define what the Third-Party Doctrine 
meant, marrying the assumption of risk with the secrecy model.  
 There were two dissenting opinions filed in this case, one from Justice Brennan 
and one from Justice Marshall.  Justice Brennan’s dissent relied on a decision of a state 
Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court, in the case Burrows v. Superior Court106.  
This case also dealt with the government seizing records from a bank.  In this decision, 
Justice Mosk explained that, “we hold petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the 
bank would maintain the confidentiality of those papers originated with him in check 
form and of the bank statements….the voluntary relinquishment of such records the 
bank at the request of the police does not constitute a valid consent by the petitioner.”107  
In this decision, the Supreme Court of California did rely on the ruling the Fifth Circuit 
made in its ruling on Miller. 
 The second dissent from Justice Marshall centered on a prior holding of the 
Supreme Court, California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz108(another case in which Marshall 
dissented).  This case centered on the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act109.  In 
this Act, there is a requirement that banks must keep records; Justice Marshall believed 
that “the required maintenance of bank customers’ records to be a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and unlawful in the absence of a warrant and 
                                                 
106 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P. 2d 590 (1974). 
107 Ibid 
108 416 U.S. 21 (1974).  
109 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (d). 
45 
probable cause.”110  Justice Marshall’s opinion had not changed and in Miller, he again 
believed that absent a warrant presented upon probable cause the seizure of bank 
records was an illegal search. 
 Despite the fact that the lower court held that by requiring the banks to hold the 
records and also using insufficient legal processes to obtain the records (using a 
subpoena and not a warrant) that the Fourth Amendment rights of Miler were violated 
the Supreme Court overturned this ruling.  An important part of this 7-2 decision were 
the four justices Burger, Blackmun, Stevens and Rehnquist that had joined the Court in 
the years after Katz declared the Fourth Amendment protected people not places.  
 This fact is noteworthy and best summed by Christopher Slobogin is his book, 
Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment: “In 
decisions handed down in the 1970s and 1980s, most of which all of the new justices 
joined [the aforementioned four], the Court indicated that in a whole host of situations, 
the expectation-of-privacy rubric does not necessarily provide any more protection than 
a property-based approach, and perhaps affords even less protection.”111  Similar to the 
quick about-face made by the Court in “the switch in time that saved nine” the situation 
that occurred here seems to have been ‘the change of four, privacy no more’.  If the 
outlook for Fourth Amendment protections was not already bleak enough, the Court 
was about to double down in another case years later. 
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Smith v. Maryland 
 Three years later in 1979, the Court would decide Smith v. Maryland.112  In this 
case, a young lady was robbed and in filling out the police report she gave a description 
of the suspect as well as the car she thought he was driving.  After a few days, she 
started to receive threatening phone calls, one of which had her stand on the porch and 
watch as the same car she had described to police drove past.  Police began to monitor 
the neighborhood and saw the car driving in the victim’s neighborhood; upon seeing 
this they ran the license plate number and got a name, Michael Smith113.   
 Upon finding out Mr. Smith’s name, the police contacted the phone company 
and asked them to install a pen register, a device that records the numbers dialed from 
the particular phone it is installed on, on to Smith’s phone.  Once a call was placed from 
Smith to the victim the police obtained a warrant to search Smith’s home.  When a 
phone book was found with the victim’s number marked Smith was arrested and later 
identified in a lineup as the man that committed the robbery.114 
 The question before the Court was to determine if the installation of a pen 
register without a court order or search warrant circumvented Smith’s Fourth 
Amendment protections.  This case was decided 5-3 with Justice Powell not taking part 
in the case.  In the majority decision, Justice Blackmun stated, “we doubt that people, in 
general, entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All 
telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the phone company 
since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are 
                                                 




completed.”115  Moreover, Blackmun reiterated the sentiment from Miller stating, “This 
Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”116   
 There were two dissenting opinions, in this case - one from Justice Stewart and 
another from Justice Marshall; both dissents were joined by Justice Brennan.  Justice 
Stewart’s dissent rested on that fact that in his mind, the numbers dialed should be 
constitutionally protected.  He states, “It is simply not enough to say, after Katz, that 
there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed because the caller 
assumes the risk that the telephone company will disclose them to the police... The 
numbers dialed from a private telephone - although certainly more prosaic than the 
conversation itself - are not without ‘content.’ ”117 
 This dissent has two main points.  Firstly, that in a post-Katz world just because 
a user voluntarily gives the phone company the numbers to complete a call does not 
mean they “assume the risk” that the phone company will then give that information 
over to police instead of using the information only for their business purposes.  
Second, and more importantly, is the belief that the numbers dialed are in fact a form of 
content.  While yes a pen register will only show a string of numbers, it is what those 
numbers can reveal that makes them valuable.  Repeated calls to someone other than a 
family member or friend could disclose a relationship, just as numerous calls to a doctor 
could divulge an illness.   
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 Justice Marshall also filed a dissent in this case.  His objection centered on the 
assumption of risk an individual could make while having no other option besides the 
use of a telephone company.  He states: 
Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice. At 
least in the third-party consensual surveillance cases, which first 
incorporated risk analysis into Fourth Amendment doctrine, the 
defendant presumably had exercised some discretion in deciding who 
should enjoy his confidential communications. By contrast here, unless a 
person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal 
or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of 
surveillance. It is idle to speak of "assuming" risks in contexts where, as 
a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.118 
 
 This dissent touches on an important idea: if a person has no other viable option 
to take the place of a particular third party, like a phone company, bank, or Internet 
service provider, then they must by default accept the risk; however the acceptance is 
not voluntary.  Justice Marshall continues by drawing the conclusion about the possibly 
chilling effect such easy access to third party records could have on many of the 
freedoms guaranteed by the constitution such as free speech, press, association, and 
more. 
 With the decisions in both Miller and Smith, the groundwork was laid for the 
Third-Party Doctrine by the Supreme Court.  Although it would be years before the 
Supreme Court itself would take up a case involving the Third-Party Doctrine, lower 
courts would continue to make decisions based on the aforementioned decisions.  It is 
important to note that in all of the dissenting opinions in both Miller and Smith the 
dissenting justices did recognize the utility of allowing the government to access 
information from third-party providers, however not at will.  In his Smith dissent, 
Justice Marshall stated, “I would require law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant 
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before they enlist telephone companies to secure information otherwise beyond the 
government's reach.”119  This dissent shows that dissenting justices were not trying to 
hamstring law enforcement, but rather protect against the unlimited searches that 
occurred in the American colonies. 
 
Chapter 8: Application of the Third-Party Doctrine 
 With the Third-Party Doctrine in place, various courts would begin to apply it to 
different situations including Internet metadata, cell phone metadata, geolocation of 
mobile phones, and others.  A distinction that has been common in the above-mentioned 
Fourth Amendment cases separated these cases between those involving content and 
those involving non-content.  Reaching all the way back to 1877 with Ex parte 
Jackson120, the Court deemed that the outside of a mailed letter to not be protected as 
the information it contained was in plain view.  However, the content, i.e. the inside of 
the document, was still an area protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
 This distinction clearly plays out in two other cases already examined.  In 
Katz121, the Supreme Court made it a clear point that in the closed telephone booth an 
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy and, therefore, the listening device 
placed that allowed FBI agents to hear what was said were not admissible as Katz’s 
voice was treated as content.  In contrast, when a pen register, a device that only 
collected the phone numbers dialed and did not allow police to hear the conversation, 
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was used in Smith122, the Court deemed that the digits were non-content and thus not 
protected under the Fourth Amendment. 
 Lower courts would also use the content/non-content distinction in their rulings.  
In 2010, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided U.S. v. Warshak123.  In this case, 
federal agents were pursuing charges against Steven and Harriet Warshak and their 
company TCI Media, Inc. for false advertising, negative-option schemes, and lying to 
credit card companies.  Using the Stored Communications Act as a part of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act124 the government issued a subpoena to 
NuVox, Warshak’s Internet service provider, to have them preserve emails.  In all, over 
27,000 emails were given to the government.   
 In a 3-0 decision, the Sixth Circuit held that government agents, in fact, violated 
the Fourth Amendment rights of Warshak by compelling his Internet service provider 
(ISP) to hand over the content of emails without securing a warrant first.  In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Keith stated that “The government cannot use email 
collection as a means to monitor citizens without a warrant any more than they can tap a 
telephone line to monitor citizens without a warrant."125  Where the agents ran into 
trouble was asking the ISP to preserve emails and thereby conducting a backdoor 
wiretap of sorts without obtaining a warrant upon probable cause. 
 While Warshak concerned with the content of emails, the fate of the non-content 
of emails was decided a few years prior.  In the 2007 case U.S. v. Forrester126, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appels deemed that the non-content of emails, such as the to and from 
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addresses, as well as internet protocol (IP) addresses of websites, visited, and all of the 
data transmitted to and from an account were not protected under the Fourth 
Amendment.  This ruling continued the thinking towards non-content the Supreme 
Court had put in place with Smith.   
 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that users should know that information that “is 
provided to and used by Internet Service Providers (ISP) for the specific purpose of 
directing the routing of information.”127  Furthermore, the Court explained that the 
government could only guess as to what content is viewed or sent because this 
information does not “necessarily reveal any more about the underlying contents of the 
communication than do phone numbers.”128  This assumption brings back the point 
brought forth by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Smith.   
 Justice Stewart said of phone numbers, “certainly more prosaic than the 
conversation itself - are not without ‘content.’”129  Here again, this dissent comes into 
play.  The information the government receives with the to/from addressing of emails 
might be similar to phone numbers although the email would likely contain the name of 
the person or company being emailed saving the government from having to look it up.  
When that information is the IP addresses of a website a person visits, however, the 
information takes on a new level of content.   
 The difference in technology from then to now is a perfect example of how in 
the Third-Party Doctrine is not equipped for the digital age.  The analogy between 
phone numbers and IP addresses, like the one in Forrester, is a false one.  While an IP 
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address is not as telling as a URL130131, a significant amount of information is still 
displayed.  The information revealed by IP addresses can be far-reaching and diverse.  
Daniel Solove notes, “"the names of stores at which a person shops, the political 
organizations a person finds interesting, a person's sexual fetishes and fantasies, her 
health concerns…”132 can all be revealed by IP addresses.  The amount of information 
that can be gathered from third-party ISP’s is simply too distinct from phone numbers to 
fall under the ruling in Smith and is much more closely related to the holding in Katz.   
 Alongside the content versus non-content debate within Third-Party Doctrine 
jurisprudence, there is the debate concerning whether the third-party is the recipient or 
if they are just an intermediary.  This idea came into play in cases like Warshak and 
Forrester because the courts decided that the Internet service provider was merely an 
“intermediary that makes email communication possible”133 not the recipient of the 
emails.  This recipient versus intermediary becomes a much larger question when the 
subject becomes the geolocation of cell phones and the government’s access to their 
records. 
 Geolocation is an issue that has proved to be divisive among lower courts, 
showing perhaps that the Supreme Court is waiting for more facts to develop before it 
makes a decisive stand on the issue, which seems to be on the horizon.  A split Fourth 
Circuit recently ruled in U.S. v. Graham134 that a search occurs when historical cell 
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phone location data is accessed and that a warrant is needed to obtain such records.  
This decision created a larger split between multiple circuits.  As Orin Kerr notes in his 
article for The Washington Post: 
[T]he decision creates a clear circuit split with the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits on whether acquiring cell-site records is a search. It also creates 
an additional clear circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit on whether, if 
cell-site records are protected, a warrant is required. Finally, it also 
appears to deepen an existing split between the Fifth and Third Circuits 
on whether the Stored Communications Act allows the government to 
choose whether to obtain an intermediate court order or a warrant for 
cell-site records.135 
 
The two competing views on this issue are as follows.  On one hand, the information 
relayed by a cell phone to the tower is not used by anyone other than the provider to 
route calls meaning that the information could be seen as created in the ordinary course 
of business and the Third-Party Doctrine would apply.  On the other hand, as the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals noted, a cell phone user does not voluntarily give location date 
to the mobile phone company in any meaningful way the application of the Third-Party 
Doctrine would be out of bounds.136   
 Allowing the geolocation of cell phones to be accessed under the Third-Party 
Doctrine would create an injustice worse than those suffered by the colonies at the 
hands of the British writs of assistance.  Even though it was often simply a formality, 
the British still required constables to petition for a writ to be granted from a judge to 
conduct their unlimited searches.  Under the Third-Party Doctrine, there is no need for 
the government to obtain a warrant or show cause before receiving information.  There 
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are some instances in other areas of Fourth Amendment case law that seem to support 
the presence of the Third-Party Doctrine. 
 
Chapter 9: Cases that possibly support the Third-Party Doctrine 
 Some might point to U.S. v. Jacobson137, 1984, as a case that possibly supports 
the Third-Party Doctrine.  In this case, the Court determined that police could open and 
search a package mailed through a private carrier after an employee of the private 
carrier searched the contents of the package.  In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens 
delivered the opinion of the Court stating, “Once frustration of the original expectation 
of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the 
now nonprivate information.”138   
 On its face, it seems like Jacobson would be a strong pillar of support however, 
since the decision in this relies on the ruling in Miller, the support seems tautological in 
nature at best.  Furthermore, there is a distinct difference between a private citizen 
alerting the government to potential wrongdoing and the government compelling a 
third-party to turn over evidence to it without first making the case to a judge and 
obtaining a warrant.  Another case that could show support for the Third-Party Doctrine 
is California v. Greenwood.139 
 Sometimes referred to as the “garbage collection case”, California v. 
Greenwood arose when the police suspected that Greenwood was dealing drugs out of 
his home.  However, the police lacked the evidence needed to obtain a search warrant; 
therefore, they searched the trash bags that had been left by the curb for pickup.  Upon 
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searching the garbage, the police found the evidence needed to obtain a search warrant 
for Greenwood’s home and during that search found drugs and arrested Greenwood.  
The question before the court was if the search of the trash bags violates the Fourth 
Amendment.  In a 6-2 decision, Justice Kennedy not taking part, the Court found that it 
did not. 
 This decision can fit squarely within the heightened protection given in Katz 
where the Court stated, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his 
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."140  Given that 
Greenwood knowingly exposed his garbage to the public by leaving it on the curb it 
was open to the public and thus the police were able to search it.  However, this fails to 
support much of what the Third-Party Doctrine has become today.  In the current digital 
world, the doctrine is used to collect vast amounts of digital information, often stored in 
some form of password protection and/or privacy settings.  This fact makes the digital 
information markedly different from a garbage bag that is left on the curb. 
 A final set of cases, collectively referred to as the “flyover cases” include 
California v. Ciraolo141 and Florida v. Riley142.  In these cases, the use of both an 
airplane and helicopter respectively were deemed valid ways of searching for illegal 
activities.  The rationale is that if a private individual were the one flying over another’s 
yard, that individual would be just as likely to view the illicit activity as police.  These 
cases follow the logic that when a person moves in the public sphere, there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  In today’s digital society, outside movement is not 
required, and the use of one or more pseudonyms is often used as individuals travel 
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across the digital world with, again, various privacy settings in place to further attempt 
to shield their movements. 
 
Balancing Technology and the Fourth Amendment 
 In the debate concerning the Third-Party Doctrine, its greatest support comes 
from Orin S. Kerr, the Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor of Law at George 
Washington University’s Law School.  Much of Kerr’s support for the Third-Party 
Doctrine comes from its perceived ability to balance the Fourth Amendment with the 
new technologies that have been created.143  Central to his argument is a thought 
exercise in which one imagines the world where third parties did not exist.  In this 
world, “you would need to venture out into the world on a regular basis to accomplish 
anything.”144  Kerr’s argument is that, when traveling out in the world, the Fourth 
Amendment provides much less protection. 
 For Kerr, it is third parties that allow criminals to conduct business through them 
and thus avoid public exposure where Fourth Amendment protections are not as high.  
With no third-parties, “The police can see when individuals leave their homes, where 
they travel, and when they arrive. Using third parties allows individuals to substitute a 
private transaction for that public transaction. Facts that used to be known from public 
surveillance are no longer so visible. By allowing individuals to use remote services, the 
use of third parties has brought outdoor activity indoors.”145  It is the flexibility awarded 
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to police by the doctrine that helps keep the balance in place between the Fourth 
Amendment and new technologies.   
 Although Kerr supports the Third-Party Doctrine, he does believe there should 
be some limitations.  He notes, “my defense of the third-party doctrine implies an 
important limit: The doctrine should apply when the third party is a recipient of 
information, but it should not apply when the third party is merely a conduit for 
information intended for someone else…. (meaning the) doctrine should apply to the 
collection of non-content information to a network but not the contents of 
communications.”146  Here again, we see the content versus non-content argument 
coming into play; however, in the digital world the distinction between content and non-
content is an often-blurred line.   
 
Chapter 10: Critiquing the Third-Party Doctrine 
 On the other hand, the critics of the Third-Party Doctrine have been challenging 
the assumptions made in it since its creation.  Some of these arguments have been 
mentioned previously; however, they are worth noting again.  One of the strongest 
arguments against the doctrine is that privacy is not an all or nothing commodity.  
Balance can be struck between public and private; the idea that once data is shared with 
a person or company, its privacy is gone forever is asinine.   
 Another criticism of the doctrine was one made in each of the dissenting 
opinions in the pivotal cases that established it.  The idea that the information is 
conveyed completely voluntarily.  With the evolution of society and no real alternatives, 
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there are third-party services that an individual has no other choice than to use.  Thirdly, 
the assumption of risk is not a given when individuals have no viable alternative as 
previously stated.  Fourth, the potential for a chilling effect on First Amendment rights 
is all too real when the communications between people and companies are not 
protected.  Lastly, while, in the late 70s, it was possible that the negative effect this 
doctrine would have on individuals was minimal, times have changed significantly to 
the point where that is no longer the case. 
 
Is Privacy an All-or-Nothing Conception? 
 The first major concern mentioned above relates to the secrecy model of the 
Fourth Amendment that was previously mentioned.  This model states that once 
information is made public in any way, it no longer enjoys protection under the Fourth 
Amendment.  This sentiment was built off of a misinterpretation of a line in the decision 
in Katz.  In the decision the Court determined that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people not places” while stating that, ““[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”147  This line has been taken out of context and misconstrued to support the 
creation of the Third-Party Doctrine.   
 In Miller, the Court seized upon this line to deem that the bank records that were 
to be used between an individual and the bank in the course of doing business were not 
protected under the Fourth Amendment.  Seemingly missing from the Court's reasoning 
was the line that immediately followed in Justices Stewart's decision stating, “But what 
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
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constitutionally protected.”148  This line drastically changes the sentiment behind the 
first.  Seeing that the documents were revealed to the bank only to conduct business and 
not exposed to the public as a whole, the Fourth Amendment protections should still 
have been in place.   
 Roughly Justice Marshall made this same point in his dissent in Smith.  He 
argued that “privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all… 
Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business 
purpose need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other 
purposes.”149  Justice Marshall is not alone in this viewpoint.  Among many, Susan 
Brenner and Leo Clarke also believe in a two-tiered system of shared information. 
   The first tier is information posted for public consumption whether it be on a 
message board online, printed in a newspaper, or a loud conversation that can be easily 
overheard in the public domain.150  Since this information has been “knowingly exposed 
to the public” there is no expectation of privacy and, therefore, no Fourth Amendment 
protections.  On the other hand, the second tier includes sharing information on a 
limited basis between an individual and whoever is receiving the information as “an 
integral part of a legitimate transaction.”151  In this second tier, the information is not 
released to the public as a whole.  Instead, it is given on a limited basis for a particular 
purpose and, therefore, should retain Fourth Amendment protections.   
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 Furthermore, dissenting in Smith, Justice Stewart noted that, like the numbers 
dialed the voice of an individual (given protection in Katz) also go through the phone 
company’s systems and allow the company to listen in.  Justice Stewart argued, “What 
the telephone company does or might do with those numbers is no more relevant to this 
inquiry than it would be in a case involving the conversation itself.”152  Justice Stewart 
would have placed the same protections on phone numbers that the conversation 
received in Katz because the phone numbers called by an individual reveals information 
about that person’s life specifically. 
 
How voluntary is the Use of Third-Parties? 
 A second major concern facing the Third-Party Doctrine concerns the use of the 
word “voluntary” in describing the information that is given to third-parties.  While this 
concern was in fact raised at the time the doctrine was created, it is even more relevant 
in modern society.  In Miller, the Court decided that bank statements and deposit slips 
were handed over voluntarily “in the ordinary course of business;”153 Similarly, in 
Smith, it was determined that phone numbers were voluntarily conveyed to phone 
companies in the process of making a call.  This argument has been echoed recently by 
justices concerning cell phone location data.154 
 The extent to which the transfer of information to third-parties is voluntary has 
been long disagreed upon.  In his dissent in Miller, Justice Brennan, argued that “for all 
practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial 
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affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the 
economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.”155  This 
sentiment was repeated by Justice Marshall in Smith.  In his dissent, he states, “…unless 
a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or 
professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance.  It is idle to 
speak of "assuming" risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no 
realistic alternative.”156 
 As Justices Brennan and Marshall explain, it is all but impossible for an 
individual to go through life and not be forced into using a third-party at some point in 
time.  This fact is even more undeniable in today’s modern society.  The advent of the 
internet and, especially, online social networking sites, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, 
Twitter, Tumblr, etc., have forever changed how we interact with our family, friends, 
co-workers, and even complete strangers.    
 Concerning these modern developments, the terms and conditions agreements 
that now permeate society in all facets of life make it next to impossible for one to have 
any choice but to “opt-in” in every given situation.  A few years ago, in 2012, Lorrie 
Faith Cranor and Aleecia McDonald decided to calculate the time needed to read all of 
the privacy policies an individual would encounter on the websites they visit.  Their 
research led to the conclusion that it would take the average American twenty-five days 
out of the year just to read all of the privacy policies they encountered.157  This amount 
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of time is staggering.  Furthermore, these terms of service agreements are now used by 
every third-party company and completely strip away the rights of individuals to truly 
“volunteer”. 
 As Christopher Slobogin noted in his aforementioned book, “It is impossible to 
get treatment, engage in financial transactions, obtain and education, or communicate 
with others without providing personal information to the relevant facilitating entities or 
allowing those entities to collect it.  To forgo these activities would mean an isolated, 
unproductive, and possibly much-foreshortened existence.”158  Slobogin goes on to note 
that, unlike in the so-called “undercover agent” cases where talking to an individual can 
reasonably be avoided, that is not an option when it comes to third-parties.   
 
Assuming the Risk 
 Hand-in-hand with the notion that the exchange of this information is voluntary 
is the idea that individuals assume the risk when exchanging information with third-
parties.  As Solbogin points out, “we (individuals) assume only those risks of 
unregulated government intrusion that the courts tell us we have to assume.”159  
Following this logic with that of Justice Marshall’s in the opinion mentioned above that 
it is futile to speak of assuming the risk when an individual has no choice, it is evident 
that simply stating that all citizens must bear the risk of sharing even the banalest of 
information with third-parties places a significant burden on society. 
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 As Justice Harlan noted in his dissent in United States v. White, “By casting it as 
‘risk analysis’ solely in terms of expectations and risks that ‘wrongdoers’ or ‘one 
contemplating illegal activities’ ought to bear, the plurality opinion, I think, misses the 
mark entirely… Interposition of a warrant requirement is designed not to shield 
‘wrongdoers,’ but to secure a measure of privacy and a sense of personal security 
throughout our society.”160  The creation of the Third-Party Doctrine only served to 
erode the measure of privacy and sense of security that Justice Harlan spoke of in his 
dissent.  In this, Justice Harlan was arguing that the Court should more carefully 
examine how its decisions will affect the privacy rights of individuals.  With the way 
the Court decided in White, an enormous burden of assuming the risk when giving any 
information to third-parties was placed on all persons. 
 
The Chilling Effect 
 A third concern about the Third-Party Doctrine is its potential to create a 
chilling effect on individual citizens, citizen-to-business, as well as business-to-business 
relationships and communications.  If a person is forced to second guess tasks that have 
become commonplace and monotonous in today’s digital society, such as owning a cell 
phone or opening an e-mail account, this places undue stress on constitutionally 
guaranteed freedoms such as speech, press, assembly, petition, and even the free 
exercise of religion.   
 This concern has been shared over the years in the expounding of the Third-
Party Doctrine.  Justice Harlan, in his dissent in White, stated that the surveillance of 
third-party records, “undermine[s] the confidence and sense of security in dealing with 
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one another that is characteristic of individual relationships between citizens in a free 
society…. words would be measured a good deal more carefully and communication 
inhibited if one suspected his conversations were being transmitted and transcribed.”161   
 In his dissent in Smith, Justice Marshall, again echoed these concern eight years 
later.  He noted that “The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring will 
undoubtedly prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to hide. Many 
individuals, including members of unpopular political organizations or journalists with 
confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of their personal 
contacts.”162   
 Furthermore, Justice Marshall went on to state his reason for this belief.  
“Permitting governmental access to telephone records on less than probable cause may 
thus impede certain forms of political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the 
hallmark of a truly free society.”163  Even in Smith, when the idea of the Third-Party 
Doctrine was in its inchoate form, Justice Marshall had the foresight to discern its 
potential as a threat to democracy.  As many other justices and scholars would come to 
point out the Third-Party Doctrine represents a clear threat when any information 
browsed on the phone or computer can be turned over to the government at a moment’s 
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Chapter 11: Recent Developments 
United States v. Jones 
 In recent years, some cases have shed new light on the Third-Party Doctrine.  
The first of these cases is United States v. Jones.164  In this case, Jones was suspected of 
drug trafficking; therefore, police obtained a search warrant to place a GPS tracking 
device on Jones’s car.  After the device was attached Jones was tracked for twenty-eight 
days, twenty-four hours a day.  On its face, this all seemed to be completely legitimate 
as an individual had no reasonable expectation of privacy on public streets because their 
movement is viewable in plain sight.165  However, as particular facts came to light, the 
legality of this search would be questioned. 
 While the fact that a search warrant was obtained is encouraging, the warrant 
stipulated that the device must be installed in the District of Columbia and within ten 
days of the warrant being issued.  This is troublesome because the device was installed 
eleven days after the warrant was issued and in the state of Maryland.  Meaning that the 
warrant had technically expired and even if it had still been active, the device was 
installed in the wrong jurisdiction.  It is for this reason that in United States v. Jones, the 
Supreme Court decided, unanimously that the use of a GPS tracking device was a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, and thus the monitoring that was done after the 
warrant expired was unlawful. 
 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court.  In this decision, however, Justice 
Scalia fell back onto the physical trespass meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  He 
stated, “…for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a 
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particular concern for government trespass upon the areas ("persons, houses, papers, 
and effects") it enumerates.”166  This position while criticized in concurring opinions, 
was enough to cover the scope of the question at stake in this case.  The reason that the 
use of trespass theory by Justice Scalia was controversial was that it was a regression in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudents and did not represent the most current standard.   
 The trespass theory came out of a 1928 decision mentioned earlier, Olmstead v. 
U.S.  However, the trespass theory was overturned in the 1967 ruling Katz v. U.S. where 
the Court famously stated that the “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”   
While Justice Scalia was correct that the thirty-nine years between Olmstead and Katz 
is a long time not relying on the standard set forth forty-five years earlier in Katz was 
unsettling and led to Justice Sotomayor concurring with the decision but not the 
reasoning.  Most of the attention concerning this case focuses on the concurring opinion 
of Justice Sotomayor. 
 In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor articulated the most stringent 
critique of the Third-Party Doctrine by a Supreme Court justice since the inception of 
the doctrine.  In keeping the full force of her criticism intact, it will be presented 
unabridged.  
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that 
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties. E.g., Smith, 442 U. S., at 
742; United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 (1976). This approach is 
ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying 
out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or 
text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail 
addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; 
and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online 
retailers. Perhaps, as Justice Alito notes, some people may find the 
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“tradeoff” of privacy for convenience “worthwhile,” or come to accept 
this “diminution of privacy” as “inevitable,” post, at 10, and perhaps not. 
I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the 
warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they 
had visited in the last week, or month, or year. But whatever the societal 
expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only if 
our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a 
prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose 
is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 
See Smith, 442 U. S., at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Privacy is not a 
discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who 
disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business 
purpose need not assume that this information will be released to other 
persons for other purposes”); see also Katz, 389 U. S., at 351–352 
(“[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected”).167 
 A critique that is biting from a Supreme Court justice was an encouraging sign 
for those that would err on the side of privacy.  Unfortunately, since this concurrence in 
2012, there have been no other remarks made at the Supreme Court level.  However, 
that does not mean that the issue is in a holding pattern across the board.  
 
DOJ Rule 41 Proposed Change 
 In 2014, the Department of Justice started to consider changing what is known 
as Rule 41.  The proposed changes would allow judges to issue warrants outside of their 
districts along with letting the FBI search without giving users prior notice, or notice at 
all.  These rule changes would also allow multiple devices to be searched without 
obtaining multiple search warrants.  Needless to say, these changes run into the same 
problems that the Third-Party Doctrine has.   
 In a memo from the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, the changes were 
debated and concerns of committee members and academics were taken into account.  
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Most notably, Orin S. Kerr gave his opinion on the proposed rule changes.  Kerr and the 
Committee found several potential problems.  The first being the particularity clause of 
the Fourth Amendment, especially if the government could not articulate the location of 
the device it wanted to search.  Secondly, there is reduced judicial oversight and the 
possibility of cherry-picking favorable judges to get warrants from.  Third, delaying 
notification can set a dangerous precedent of obtaining warrants for remote searches 
over physical searches to delay notification.168 
 Despite the concerns put forth by the subcommittee members and Kerr, the DOJ 
has been progressing with the rule changes anyway.  The Judicial Conference Advisory 
committee on Criminal Rules voted in favor of the modification.169  This led Google to 
file a formal opposition to the proposed rule changes in 2015.170  This organized 
opposition has had little effect as the rule changes are still moving forward.  Senator 
Ron Wyden of Oregon has said, “The rule change will go into effect later this year 
unless committed people mobilize to stop it.”171   
 Thus far there has not been a public outrage or even news coverage as the issues 
have flown under the radar.  With the rule change due to come up for review by the 
Supreme Court and barring any objections, the rule changes could take effect in 
December of 2016.172  While the changes to Rule 41 and the Third-Party Doctrine may 
not seem related at first glance, there is a connection.   
                                                 










 This rule change goes hand in hand with problems that exist in the Third-Party 
Doctrine, namely the resurrection of general warrants allowing government offices to 
meet minimum requirements and get full warrant powers.  Aside from this, it is likely 
that the government will use the reasoning in the Third-Party Doctrine to support the 
rule change.  Since the information being sought is held by Third-Parties,173 the DOJ 
will likely take the position that individuals have no expectation of privacy since the 
information has been given to third-parties.   
 With the recent passing of Justice Scalia, and his seat empty for the foreseeable 
future, the proposal from the Court will likely hinge on Justice Kennedy’s vote which 
will likely lead to a tie or denial.  Taking what Justice Sotomayor said in her 
concurrence in Jones, it is probable that she will be advocating against the rule changes.  
The proposal the Court gives will provide some insight into its current thinking on 
issues concerning privacy, security, and Fourth Amendment law.  This will be telling; 
however, depending on when the empty seat is filled this thinking could be changed. 
 
Riley v. California 
 Also in 2014, a Supreme Court case further cemented its position on Fourth 
Amendment issues in the digital age.  Riley v. California174 was decided in tandem with 
United States v. Wurie175.  Both cases centered on the issue of police searches of digital 
information on cell phones from individuals arrested, done without a warrant. 
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 The facts of the cases are as follows.  Police stopped Riley for having expired 
tags, and it was found that he had a suspended license as well.  Upon a search of the car, 
firearms were recovered, and police arrested Riley.  Having a cell phone on his person 
at the time of the arrest police searched the pictures and videos on the phone and 
determined that Riley was affiliated with a gang.  Due to the information gleaned from 
searching the phone the state sought an enhanced sentence due to Riley’s gang 
affiliation.  In the subsequent case, Wurie was arrested after he was observed buying 
drugs.  When Wurie was brought to the station, the police took his cell phone and saw 
he had received multiple calls from a contact identified as “my house.”  The police then 
opened the phone to obtain the number to trace the location of Wurie’s residence.  After 
securing the address police obtained a warrant for the apartment and found drugs, 
firearms, and cash in the ensuing search.  The phones in question differed in each case. 
Wurie possessed an older style “flip” phone with limited features, while Riley’s phone 
was a “smart” phone with the latest features.  However, at stake was the larger issue of 
personal cell phone privacy in general.   
 These cases forced the court to confront how the search of digital information 
would stand up to the trilogy of search incident to arrest cases176.  In Chimel v. 
California the Court held that when making an arrest in a home the police could 
lawfully search and seize anything found on the arrestee and in their immediate reach; 
however, a warrant must be secured before searching the rest of the house.  The 
justification for allowing a controlled warrantless search was two-fold: firstly, to secure 
the officers’ safety and secondly, to recover and preserve any evidence that may be on 
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or in the immediate area of the arrestee.  Four years later in United States v. Robinson, 
the Court held that a full search of an arrestee, including inspection of items found on 
them177 was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.  Lastly, in Arizona v. Gant, the Court 
stated that police might only search if the arrestee was within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment or there is a reason to believe that there is evidence related to 
the offense in the car.   
 Here the Court attempted to strike a balance between privacy and governmental 
interest.  In the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts admits that the standard in Robinson 
could have applied in that it allowed for searching an arrestee and inspecting items 
found on their person.  However, C.J. Roberts rightfully reasoned, “while Robinson’s 
categorical rule strikes the appropriate balance in the context of physical objects, neither 
of its rationales has much force with respect to digital content on cell phones.”178  The 
exceptions noted in Chimel - officer harm and destruction of evidence - are not at stake 
when dealing with digital content on cell phones.  Due to this, the Court did not extend 
the Robinson and Chimel exemptions to cell phones.  Roberts did yield that with today’s 
technology remote wiping capability was possible but the police could take simple steps 
to prevent this including taking out the battery, turning the phone off, or using a 
Faraday bag179.   
 Another key point in this decision was the way cell phones themselves were 
treated:  
Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from 
other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person. The term “cell 
phone” is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact 
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minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a 
telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players, 
rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, 
televisions, maps, or newspapers.180 
 
This section shows that in the Court’s thinking digital information and the devices that 
carry it are unique.  Indeed, a cell phone, “contains in digital form many sensitive 
records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private 
information never found in a home in any form.”181  Taking the position that electronic 
data stored on cell phones should be treated differently from other objects typically 
found on the average person is an encouraging step by the Supreme Court.   
 Another encouraging sign from the Court is tucked toward the end of the 
opinion.  In arguing its case, the state attempted to make the point that police should be 
able to search a phone's call log, as in what happened in the Wurie case.  The 
justification for this would seem to come from one of the cases that helped to establish 
the Third-Party Doctrine, Smith v. Maryland.  Looking back, Smith stated that no 
warrant was needed to use a pen register with the phone company to identify numbers 
dialed by certain callers.  The Court, in this instance, came to the conclusion that there 
is no question that a search took place in Wurie.  Furthermore, the Court reasoned, “call 
logs typically contain more than just phone numbers; they include any identifying 
information that an individual might add, such as the label ‘my house’ in Wurie’s 
case.”182  The refusal to extend the reach of the ruling in Smith to cell phone logs is an 
encouraging step by the Supreme Court.   
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State v. Andrews 
 This issue is not just one being played out on the national level; state courts are 
grappling with the same problems.  A decision handed down on March 30th, 2016 shows 
signs that at least one state court is starting to push back against the abuses against the 
Fourth Amendment.  An appellate court in Maryland handed down a promising decision 
in State v. Andrews that is encouraging for those advocating increased privacy.  This 
case also brought to light some rather unsettling information about how new 
technologies that have been developed in the private sector could be detrimental to the 
Fourth Amendment rights of individuals are kept secret.   
 The case began when Kerron Andrews was positively identified via 
photographic array as the person who shot three people on April 27, 2014, as they were 
attempting to purchase drugs on the 4900 block of Stafford Street in Baltimore City. He 
was charged with attempted first-degree murder and attendant offenses in connection 
with the shooting, and a warrant for his arrest was issued on May 2, 2014.183  In order to 
try to locate Andrews, the Baltimore police used a new device called Hailstorm. 
 The trouble started when the police asked the Court for the utilization of a pen 
register/ trap and trace (PR/TT) to try and locate Andrews from a number provided by a 
confidential informant.  However, the Hailstorm device works differently from a 
PR/TT, and the order for a PR/TT only requires only showing relevance, not probable 
cause.  This distinction is important because of how Hailstorm works.  The police use 
the information given by the cell service providers (serial numbers) and input that 
information into the Hailstorm device; the device is then used like a cell tower that 
searches for the device in question by sending out electronic signals.   
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 This is a problem because the device is sending electronic signals through walls 
and into private dwellings and the order obtained by police was for a PR/TT and thus 
does not meet the requirements for invading a home with electronic signals.  This 
naturally leads to another question: why did the police not just inform the court of the 
device in question and its methods in order to obtain a warrant to justify its use?  This 
was not done because of a nondisclosure agreement between Baltimore City State’s 
Attorney and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order for Baltimore’s police 
department to be able to purchase the equipment. 
 The following is an excerpt of the nondisclosure agreement used in the court's 
opinion: 
[T]o ensure that [] wireless collection equipment/technology continues to 
be available for use by the law enforcement community, the 
equipment/technology and any information related to its functions, 
operation, and use shall be protected from potential compromise by 
precluding disclosure of this information to the public in any 
manner including b[ut] not limited to: in press release, in court 
documents, during judicial hearings, or during other public forums 
or proceedings. Accordingly, the Baltimore City Police Department 
agrees to the following 23 conditions in connection with its purchase and 
use of the Harris Corporation equipment/technology: 
5. The Baltimore City Police Department and Office of the State’s 
Attorney for Baltimore City shall not, in any civil or criminal 
proceeding, use or provide any information concerning the Harris 
Corporation wireless collection equipment/technology, its associated 
software, operating manuals, and any related documentation 
(including its technical/engineering description(s) and capabilities) 
beyond the evidentiary results obtained through the use the 
equipment/technology including, but not limited to, during pre-trial 
matters, in search warrants and related affidavits, in discovery, in 
response to court ordered disclosure, in other affidavits, in grand 
jury hearings, in the State’s case-in-chief, rebuttal, or on appeal, or 
in testimony in any phase of civil or criminal trial, without the prior 
written approval of the FBI. (Emphasis added)184 
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 Along with these requirements, the agreement stated, “in the event of a Freedom 
of Information Act request, or a court order directing disclosure of information 
regarding Harris Corporation equipment or technology, the FBI must be notified 
immediately to allow them time to intervene “and potential[ly] compromise.” If 
necessary “the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore will, at the request of the 
FBI, seek dismissal of the case in lieu of using or providing, or allowing others to 
provide, any information concerning the Harris Corporation wireless collection 
equipment/technology[.]”185 
 This language is extremely troubling; it shows the FBI attempting to keep 
intentionally secret a device that, by the appeals court of Maryland and certainly others, 
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals.  The Hailstorm device can only 
obtain information when the device is not in use.  Meaning that, if a user is on the 
phone, the technology does not work.  The appellate court found this to be particularly 
troubling. 
 The court of appeals relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Katz and Kyllo 
to decide key parts of this case.  Looking back on Katz, the use of the two-pronged 
privacy test was implemented.  The Court decided that individuals do have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy that their cell phones will not be used to locate them, especially 
when they are not in use.  Furthermore, they found that this expectation of privacy is 
one that society would recognize as reasonable.  Kyllo v. United States was a case in 
which the government believed Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home and used 
thermal imaging to detect the increased heat signatures from inside the house.  
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 In Kyllo, the Supreme Court stated, “[w]here…the Government uses a device 
that is not in general public use, to explore the details of the home that would previously 
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is 
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”186  This same reasoning was used in 
State v. Andrews with Hailstorm as it sends electronic signals through walls thus 
violating the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizures 
without a warrant.   
 The state attempted to fall back on the Third-Party Doctrine to salvage its case 
saying that the information was transmitted from the Andrews phone to a third party 
and thus he was not entitled to Fourth Amendment protections.  However, the court did 
not accept this argument as the Hailstorm device forces the phone to reveal its location 
and the user does nothing to supply its location; in fact, as stated above, if the user is 
making a phone call the Hailstorm device will not work.  This ruling from the appellate 
court in Maryland shows that perhaps justices are starting to reconsider giving the 
executive a blank check when it comes to testing the Fourth Amendment protections of 
citizens. 
 
Chapter 12: Conclusion  
 In all of this criticism of the Third-Party Doctrine, it is important to keep in 
mind that I am not advocating for the government to discontinue all use of electronic 
surveillance and to shut out the option of using third-parties as resources when 
investigating crimes that have been or will be committed.  My opposition to the Third-
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Party Doctrine, as it is currently understood, emanates from the ability of the 
government to, without a warrant presented upon probable cause, acquire vast amounts 
of information on any individual, especially if that individual is an American citizen.  
 When the founding fathers fought for independence from the British Empire 
they fought for many reasons, chief among them the right for citizens to be able to live 
their lives free from the tyranny of an oppressive and intrusive government.  The writs 
of assistance executed in the colonies gave government officials carte blanche in 
searching any person or place they desired.  As previously mentioned, the Paxton Case 
was the colonists’ attempt to get rid of these writs within the colonial system.  When 
that attempt failed, more drastic measures were brought to bear on the situation.    
  The original meaning of the Fourth Amendment seemed to suggest that the 
amendment was created to stop the use of general warrants and protect the privacy of 
citizens.  In today's digital world the existence of the Third-Party Doctrine brings back 
the threat of the general warrants without the need to even secure a warrant from a 
judge.  It is for these reasons and more that the continued existence of the Third-Party 
Doctrine puts in jeopardy the protections against unreasonable search and seizure 
envisioned by the framers of the fourth amendment.  This doctrine allows the 
government to circumvent all constitutional protections to search massive amounts of 
data at will without cause.  
 At the time of creation of the constitution specific warrants had won the battle 
against general warrants and in the Fourth Amendment this was codified by the 
particularity clause and probable cause requirements. It is no stretch of the imagination 
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to believe the framers of the Constitution would be appalled at the amount of data for 
Third-Party Doctrine gives the government access to without requiring a warrant.  
 While the amount of data accessible to the government via third parties in the 
1970’s might have been acceptable to facilitate the creation of the third-party doctrine; 
times have since changed substantially, and the risk posed to the privacy of individuals 
and the harm to constitutionally protected rights is at a point where the continuation of 
the Third-Party Doctrine is no longer legally sustainable.   
 With Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones and the decision by the appellate 
court in State v. Andrews, there is a reason to believe that new legislation and/or a shift 
in judicial thinking might be occurring and will lead to a strengthening of Fourth 
Amendment protections.  Along with these optimistic signs from the judicial branch, 
there are legislators like Senator Ron Wyden and others that show some fight in the 
legislative branch.  This is a start; however, in order to make sure this issue is taken 
seriously media attention and a groundswell of public outrage would go far in helping to 
achieve lasting change. 
  At a time when leaked government documents bring headlines of domestic 
spying and outrage from the citizenry, it is important to understand that these are not the 
only Fourth Amendment questions at stake.  The Third-Party Doctrine, created by the 
Supreme Court in the late 1970’s after a slew of conservative appointments, also raises 
Fourth Amendment concerns.  It is all but impossible to take part fully in today’s digital 
world without giving information to third party providers.   
 Up to this point, scholarly attention on the Third-Party Doctrine revolved around 
debating the legitimacy of the doctrines existence, not on a discussion of the doctrines 
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origin.  This doctrine was produced by a conservative reactionary Supreme Court filled 
with Richard Nixon’s appointees who intended to promote a strict constructionist 
viewpoint by justices and handing down decisions to endorse a law and order 
atmosphere.  By understanding the origin of the Third-Party Doctrine, the question of 
its continued existence in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be discussed.  The 
remedy to the threat posed by the Third-Party Doctrine to the Fourth Amendment is not 
some complex judicial test or abstruse Supreme Court decision; it is deceptively simple: 
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